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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
Defendants agree the current matter arises out of their representation of the Plaintiff in 
her underlying divorce action from Darwin McKay. However, contrary to the Plaintiffs 
representations, the Plaintiff filed her Complaint solely claiming the Defendants breached a duty 
owed to her in their drafting of the Property Settlement Agreement C'PSA") which was 
incorporated into the divorce decree. For the first time on summary judgment, the Plaintiff 
claimed the Defendants breached a duty owed to her based upon advice she claimed they 
provided to her. The Plaintiff: thereafter. waived that argument. at least in part, below. The 
Plaintiffs appeal only seeks review of the District Court's decision as it relates to the drafting of 
the PSA. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition 
The Defendants moved for summary judgment on January 6, 2011 wherein they argued 
the Plaintiffs legal malpractice claim failed as a matter of law because she could not establish 
(1) the Defendants breached any duties owed to her: (2) the alleged breach was the proximate 
cause of her alleged damages; or (3) she suffered actual damages recoverable under the law. The 
District Court heard argument on the Defendants' motion on February 3, 2011 and entered its 
written decision denying summary judgment on February 22, 2011. In its written decision, 
entitled Order Denying Defendants· Motion for Summary Judgment, R 572, the District Court 
found there was a genuine issue of fact regarding "whether the Defendants breached the standard 
of care in Idaho when [Mr. Walker allegedly] incorrectly stated the law to Mrs. McKay, thus 
leading her to believe that she would have a secured interest in her husband's mortgage on the 
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Albrethsen property." R 578. The basis for the District Court's decision was an October 23, 
2007 email exchange to which the District Court inadvertently applied an unreasonable 
interpretation. Specifically, the District Court changed the language in the Plaintiffs October 
23, 2007 email to the Defendants to read "Albrethsen property mortgage" rather than ··Status 
Corp closure''. The District Court did this even though the Plaintiff did not mention the October 
23, 2007 email on summary judgment; the Plaintiff was unaware of the mortgage at the time of 
the October 23, 2007 email; and the Plaintiff did not argue that the mortgage, rather than the 
Home Farm Property closure, was the subject of her email. 
The Defendants then filed a Motion to Reconsider, R 639, wherein they respectfully 
asserted the District Court's finding was made in error as the conclusion was based upon the 
October 23, 2007 email exchange, which they argued the District Court inadvertently 
misinterpreted to refer to a different piece of property. Contrary to the District Court's decision, 
the October 23, 2007 email exchange was not addressing the Albrethsen property, which had 
closed prior to October 2007, or the mortgage on that property. Instead, the October 23, 2007 
email pertained to the sale of the Home Farm property by Darwin McKay to Status Corporation, 
which transaction was expected to close in the future on or about March 30, 2008. As the email 
pertained to the Home Farm property, Mr. Walker's email was a correct statement of law. 
Accordingly, the Defendants argued Mr. Walker's email could not be the basis of a 
determination that the Defendants breached a duty of care and it could not be the grounds for 
denying summary judgment to the Defendants. 
The District Court heard argument on the Defendants' Motion to Reconsider and 
thereafter denied it. See generally Memorandum Decision & Order, R 852. In doing so, the 
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District Court ruled that a reasonable interpretation of the October 23, 2007 email exchange was 
that the Plaintiff was referring to the Albrethsen mortgage payoff and the Plaintiff could have 
"used the word ·closure' where a person with more experience in real estate transactions ... would 
have used a more precise term such as ·mortgage' or ·payoff." See R 857. The District Court 
further held the Plaintiff ·'may have incorrectly assumed that the title company was handling 
both the mortgage payoff and the transfer of Home Farm." See R 857-58. The District Court 
then held ''the Defendants have not demonstrated exactly what Mrs. McKay"s understanding was 
in this record." See R 858. 
The Defendants thereafter filed a Second Motion to Reconsider, R 901, wherein they 
respectfully argued that the District Cow1's rulings in the Order and Reconsider Order were in 
error. In support of their position, the Defendants argued: (I) the District Court drew an 
unreasonable inference as to the Plaintiffs intention when she wrote ·'Status Corp Closure·· in 
her October 23, 2007 email; (2) the Plaintiffs intention in drafting the October 23, 2007 email is 
irrelevant as the focal inquiry is how Mr. Walker interpreted her email and whether his 
interpretation was reasonable; (3) given Mr. Walker's reasonable interpretation of the Plaintiffs 
October 23, 2007 email, his email in response was a correct statement oflaw; (4) the October 23, 
2007 email from Mr. Walker was not a proximate cause of the Plaintiffs damages; and (5) the 
opinions of the Plaintiffs expe1i witness, Bryan Smith, should be disregarded as they were not 
supported by the facts. The Defendants further argued the District Court incorrectly placed the 
burden of proof on them when it held the Defendants had not established the Plaintiffs 
understanding of the October 23, 2007 email exchange, as, under Idaho law, the Plaintiff had the 
burden of proving her claims. 
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The District Court heard argument on the Respondent's Second Motion to Reconsider on 
June 26, 2014. During oral argument (as well as in her opposition brief), the Plaintiff stated that 
the alleged malpractice was based upon the drafting of the PSA, not the representations made in 
the October 23. 2007 email exchange. At the hearing, Plaintiffs counsel specifically conceded 
·'there is nothing in the October [23, 2007] email that constitutes malpractice." Tr., p. 86:22-24. 
Following argument, the District Court allowed the parties to provide supplemental briefing on 
·'the issue of whether this security interest could have arisen by operation of law even if Mr. 
McKay were unwilling to grant the security interest in the [Albrethsen] mortgage:· Tr., p. 
98: 13-20. The parties provided such briefing and the District Court thereafter entered its 
A1emorandum Decision and Order. R 957, wherein it granted the Defendants' Second Motion to 
Reconsider. 
In its Memorandum Decision and Order, the District Court found that the Defendants did 
not err in drafting the PSA because no amount of drafting could have created a security interest 
in the Albrethsen mortgage. That was because the mortgage was personal property, rather than 
real property. Therefore, a security interest could not be created in the mortgage under the 
operation of law, including under either I.C. § 10-1110 or I.C. § 32-918. The Court further 
found that the Plaintiff did not offer evidence to support a finding of proximate causation. In 
particular, the Plaintiff failed to establish that she would have received a more favorable 
outcome, but for the Defendants' alleged PSA drafting error. To the contrary, the record 
established that Mr. McKay would not have voluntarily granted the Plaintiff a secured interest in 
the mortgage. Additionally, the Plaintiff was precluded from seeking the same from the divorce 
court due to the Handwritten Agreement she entered into which did not provide security and 
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required arbitration with the mediator if the parties could not agree upon the language of the 
PSA. Moreover. the evidence established the Plaintiff was aware she was not receiving a 
secured interest when she executed the Handwritten Agreement. 
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
• Underlying Divorce Action 
On or about August 21, 2006, the Plaintiff filed for divorce from Mr. McKay in Case No. 
CV DR 0615200 in the Magistrate Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the State of Idaho, in 
and for the County of Ada (hereinafter ·'Underlying Action"). In November 2006. the Plaintiff 
retained the Def end ants to represent her in her previously filed divorce action against Mr. 
McKay. See Affidavit of Stanley Welsh in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary 
Judgment, R 23-24, ,r,r 2-3. During the course of the divorce action, the Plaintiff and Mr. McKay 
agreed to mediate. See R 24, ,r 7. The mediation was scheduled for and did occur on Saturday, 
October 20, 2007. See id. Defendant Tom Walker and Stanley Welsh, a partner at Defendant 
Cosho Humphrey, represented the Plaintiff at the mediation. See id., -is; Affidavit of Thomas 
Walker in Suppo1i of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, R 49, -i 4. The Plaintiff also 
attended the mediation which lasted approximately 9 hours. See id., ,r 4. Throughout the 
mediation, the Plaintiff and Mr. McKay negotiated the distribution of the property acquired by 
one or both of them during their marriage. See id. The Plaintiff was actively involved in the 
negotiations. See id., ,r 6; R 24, ,r 8; R 139, p. 86:5-7. 
During the mediation, Messrs. Walker and Welsh informed the Plaintiff that settlement 
was not required or necessary and that, if she chose to end the mediation, they would 
aggressively pursue the motion for summary judgment and would try her case in January 2008. 
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See R 50, f 8; R 25, f I I; R 136, p. 74:1-16. Throughout the mediation, Messrs. Walker and 
Welsh were available to the Plaintiff to answer questions and to discuss the negotiations. See R 
49-50, ,r 7; R 25, f 1 O; R 137, p. 79:21-80:5. 
At the October 20, 2007 mediation, the Plaintiff and Mr. McKay entered into a 
handwritten settlement agreement which was drafted by the mediator, Judge Duff McKee 
(hereinafter "'Handwritten Agreement'"). See R 13 7, p. 79: 14-20; R 269. The Plaintiff was an 
active part of the negotiations which lead to the creation of the Handwritten Agreement and she 
voluntarily entered into the Handwritten Agreement. See R 137, p. 80:6-11; R 139, p. 86:5-7. 
Prior to executing the Handwritten Agreement, the Plaintiff had questions about it which she 
discussed with the Defendants. See R 13 7, p. 79:21-80:5. According to the Plaintiff, the 
Defendants answered all of her questions to her satisfaction. See id. Messrs. Walker and Welsh 
also informed the Plaintiff, if she was uncomfortable with the terms of the Handwritten 
Agreement, she could decline to execute it and they could end the mediation. See R 25, ,i 11; R 
50, ,r 8. At the time of execution, the Plaintiff reviewed the Handwritten Agreement and was 
satisfied with the framework of it. See R 138, p. 82:20-23. The Plaintiff executed the 
Handwritten Agreement even though she was fully aware that (I) Mr. McKay no longer owned 
the Albrethsen property1; (2) she was not receiving an interest of any kind in the Albrethsen 
1 The "Albrethsen property" is real property which was purchased and sold by Mr. 
McKay during his marriage to the Plaintiff. As a part of the sale, Mr. McKay held a mortgage. 
Per the Property Settlement Agreement, which was incorporated into the Judgment and Decree 
of Divorce between the Plaintiff and Mr. McKay, payment of this mortgage or Mr. McKay's 
receipt of proceeds from the sale of the Albrethsen property constituted triggering events for 
when certain of Mr. McKay's payment obligations to the Plaintiff became due. 
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property; (3) Mr. McKay was not providing any land as collateral; and (4) Mr. McKay was not 
willing to provide any security in any property as his real property was encumbered by bank 
loans and other debt. See R 139, p. 86:1-4; R 146-47, pp. 116:22-117:4; R 26, ,i 12; R 50, ,i,i10, 
11. 
The Handwritten Agreement was intended to resolve all of the property distribution 
issues between the Plaintiff and Mr. McKay. See R 269. Per the Handwritten Agreement, the 
Plaintiff agreed, inter alia: ''Parties, through counsel, to incorporate these terms into a 
comprehensive property settlement agreement. Parties agree that any dispute over the terms 
thereof or otherwise over the interpretation of this [handwritten] agreement will be submitted to 
Judge McKee for binding arbitration." Id. 
Pursuant to the Handwritten Agreement, the Defendants, on behalf of the Plaintiff, 
prepared a draft property settlement agreement based upon the Handwritten Agreement. See R 
51, ,i 14. On October 23, 2007, the Defendants forwarded this draft to the Plaintiff and Mr. 
McKay's counsel. See id.; R 278. That draft addressed only the Home Farm property; it did not 
mention the Albrethsen property or the mortgage on the Albrethsen property. See id. Following 
her review of the initial draft of the PSA, the Plaintiff sent an email to the Defendants which read 
as follows: 
All looks good Tom. However, can I place a lien with the title company on the 
Status Corp closure so the $800,000.00 are paid to me by them? This is what we 
had to do when property sold that Donna had so the funds would come to us 
instead of thru Donna. 
Mr. Walker reasonably interpreted the email as referring to the Home Farm property (the only 
property mentioned in the draft PSA) and responded: 
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Our plan is to record the Judgment and Decree of Divorce, which then becomes a 
lien on all of Darwin's real and personal property. We don't want to emphasize 
this aspect of the settlement. So, we don't want to say anything until after the 
judge signs the Judgment and Decree. 
At the time of the October 23, 2007 email exchange, the Plaintiff was not aware of the 
mortgage Mr. McKay held on the Albrethsen property; rather, she did not learn of the mortgage 
until she received the final PSA. See R 480 (stating ·'Plaintiff wife was not made aware of the 
mortgage until it was first referenced in the last draft of the Agreement which was ultimately 
executed"'). 
The Plaintiff was provided with a copy of the final Property Settlement Agreement 
(hereinafter ''PSA'') on or about November 19, 2007. See R 321; R 51, ,i 14. The Plaintiff had a 
full opportunity to review the PSA and to formulate and ask any questions she had with regard to 
the same. See R 152, p. 137: 11-21. The Plaintiff received answers to her questions and was 
satisfied with the answers she received. See id. On November 20. 2007, the Plaintiff voluntarily 
executed the PSA. See R 152, p. 137: 11-14; R 52, ,i 19. 
The PSA was incorporated as Exhibit ''A .. of the Stipulation for Judgment and Decree of 
Divorce which was filed on November 28, 2007. See R 368. On November 29, 2007. the trial 
court executed the Judgment and Decree of Divorce which incorporated the PSA as Exhibit ·'A." 
See id. The Defendants recorded a complete copy of the Judgment and Decree of Divorce 
(including the PSA) in the following Idaho counties: Ada. Murphy, Owyhee, and Teton. See R 
52, ,I 20. 
• Albrethsen Transaction 
Prior to the divorce between the Plaintiff and Mr. McKay. Mr. McKay purchased and 
sold real property commonly known as the ''Albrethsen property''. See R 239-40, ,i,i 173, 183, 
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185-187; R 411. Mr. McKay sold the Albrethsen property to Status Corporation in exchange for 
a down payment and a mortgage of $1,396,800. See R 412, ,r 5. At some unknown time, Mr. 
McKay obtained title insurance for the aforementioned mortgage. See R 394, p. 12: 11-19; R 
395, p. 19: 12-21. 
At the time of the October 2007 settlement negotiations and when the PSA was entered 
into, Mr. McKay only had an ownership interest in the Home Farm Property. See R 374, ~ 1.8. 
Mr. McKay did not have an ownership interest in the Albrethsen property2. In fact, the closing 
occurred and the title to the Albrethsen property was transferred to Status Corporation in 
November 2006. See R 763 (Warranty Deed); R 780, p. 33:24-34:2. 
According to Mr. McKay, Status Corporation did not pay him monies due under the 
mortgage. See R 410. As such, on July 18, 2008, Mr. McKay filed a Verified Complaint for 
Foreclosure against Status Corporation. See id. As a result of his suit against Status 
Corporation, on August 19. 2008, Mr. McKay secured a Judgment for $1,257,457.30 plus pre-
judgment and post-judgment interest. See R 422. Due to the title company securing first position 
to Mr. McKay as well as another entity, in November 2008, the title company paid Mr. McKay 
$1,288,019.10 and Mr. McKay assigned the Judgment he received against Status Corporation to 
the title company. See R 399, p. 33:3-16. 
2 The Plaintiff was well aware Mr. McKay did not own the Albrethsen Property before 
the October 23, 2007 email exchange as she previously executed the Warranty Deed transferring 
title of the Albrethsen Prope1iy to the Status Corporation. See R 240, ~ 188; R 763 (Warranty 
Deed). Additionally, in Paragraph 1.8 of the PSA, the Plaintiff acknowledged that Mr. McKay 
only held title to the Home Farm Property and that he only held a mortgage secured by the 
Albrethsen Property. See R 374, ~ 1.8. 
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• Post-Divorce Proceedings 
Through new counsel (Scott Hess of Hawley Troxell), the Plaintiff filed a Motion for 
Contempt against Mr. McKay. See R 428. The Motion for Contempt trial began on July 9, 
2009. See R 432. Before the trial concluded. the Plaintiff entered into a new settlement 
agreement with Mr. McKay. See R 96. This new settlement agreement was intended to replace 
the PSA. See id.; R 445. On July 16, 2009, the court questioned the Plaintiff regarding the new 
settlement agreement. See R 100, pp. 14:6-16: 11. The Plaintiff informed that court that she 
voluntarily entered into the new settlement agreement and that she agreed with each of terms of 
the new settlement agreement. See id. The new settlement agreement was memorialized in an 
Order Regarding Settlement of All Claims which was executed by the Plaintiff and approved and 
entered by the trial court. See R 445. Pursuant to the Order Regarding Settlement a/All Claims, 
the Plaintiff agreed to dismiss the motion for contempt claims; "'agree[d] not to attempt to 
enforce any term of that Judgment and Decree of Divorce filed 11/29/07."; and agree[d] that the 
Order Regarding Settlement of All Claims ·'supplants all unfulfilled financial provisions of the 
Judgment and Decree filed l l /29/07, specifically paragraphs 1.7 through and including 
paragraph l .8.2:· See R 446, ,i I. As a part of the Order Regarding Settlement ofAll Claims, the 
Plaintiff agreed to waive any attorney fees which she could have collected from Mr. McKay in 
the contempt proceedings. See R 451, ,i 4. On August 19, 2009, the trial court also entered 
Judgment. See R 441. Per the Order Regarding Settlement of All Claims, the Plaintiff agreed 
·'not to execute the August 19, 2009 Judgment as long as Defendant DARWIN MCKAY is not in 
default of the Order herein." See R 450, ~ 3. 
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Ill. ADDITIONAL ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
• Whether the Plaintiffs appeal should be disregarded to the extent the Plaintiff raises 
issues not argued before the District Court. 
• Whether the Plaintiffs appeal should be disregarded to the extent the Plaintiff raises 
issues she waived before the District Court. 
IV. ARGUMENT 
A. The Plaintifrs Appeal Should be Disregarded to the Extent it Raises Issues Not Argued 
Below 
The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly held that matters not raised below will not be 
considered on appeal. See e.g. Zylstra v. State, 157 Idaho 457 (2014) ("With the exception of 
jurisdictional issues, '[a]n argument not raised below and not supported in the briefs is waived on 
appeal'"). Here, the Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that ·'multiple Idaho statutes treat 
m01tgages as the equivalent of an interest in real property." This argument was not advanced by 
the Plaintiff below. Therefore, it should not be considered on appeal. 
The Plaintiff also argues, for the first time on appeal, that J.C. § 8-506A( d) applies. She 
did not present this argument below nor did she make any argument related to writs of 
attachment. Consequently, the Plaintiffs claims related to the application of J.C. § 8-506A(d) 
should be disregarded on appeal. 
Finally, the Plaintiff argues for the first time on appeal that her expectations of security 
existed at the time of mediation and when she executed the Handwritten Agreement due to some 
either unspecified advice or post-October 20, 2007 advice she received from the Defendants. As 
this argument was not raised below, it should be disregarded on appeal. 
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B. The Plaintifr s Appeal Should be Disregarded to the Extent She Waived Arguments 
Below 
In her opposition brief to the Defendants' Second Motion to Reconsider, the Plaintiff 
conceded that her malpractice claim did not arise from the alleged representations or advice 
provided by the Defendants in the October 23, 2007 email exchange. The Plaintiff solidified her 
concession at oral argument when her counsel stated: ·'the issue of whether this security interest 
could have arisen by operation of law even if Mr. McKay were unwilling to grant the security 
interest in the [Albrethsen] mortgage.'' Tr., p. 98: 13-20. 
As a result of the above concession, the Plaintiff has waived any argument that her 
malpractice action is based upon the alleged advice provided by the Defendants. Notably, 
throughout the course of the current action, the Plaintiff has not specifically identified any advice 
(other than the October 23, 2007 email) which she received from the Defendants at any time 
prior to her execution of the PSA. 
Consequently, the Defendants respectfully request that the Court disregard any arguments 
by the Plaintiff that the October 23, 2007 email supports her malpractice action or that her 
malpractice action is based upon advice she purportedly received from the Defendants. 
C. The Trial Court Correctly Determined that the Defendants did Not Breach a Duty 
Owed to the Plaintiff 
To establish her claim of attorney malpractice, the Plaintiff must prove: (I) an attorney-
client relationship existed; (2) the Defendants had a duty to the Plaintiff; (3) the Defendants 
breached the duty it owed to the Plaintiff; and (4) the Defendants' failure to perform the duty 
was the proximate cause of the damages suffered by the Plaintiff. See e.g. Marias v. Marano, 
120 Idaho 11, 13,813 P.2d 350 (1991). The Plaintiff must also establish that she would have 
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had "some chance of success'· in the underlying action but for the Defendants' actions. See e.g. 
Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269, 272, 923 P.2d 976, 979 (1996). 
The Plaintiff contends the District Court erred in dismissing her malpractice claim based 
upon its findings that no breach occurred and the non-existence of proximate cause. In her brief, 
the Plaintiff first argues the court erred in finding the lack of a breach of a duty by the 
Defendants. According to the Plaintiff, the error occurred because the District Court allegedly 
incorrectly categorized a mortgage as personal property, rather than as real property. As is 
explained below, the Plaintiffs argument is flawed and misconstrues Idaho statutes and case 
law. 
The issue before the District Court (and now on appeal) was the Plaintiffs allegation that 
the Defendants allegedly breached a duty owed to her because they did not draft the PSA in such 
a way that it provided the Plaintiff with a secured interest in the mortgage held by Darwin on the 
Albrethsen Property. A review of the merits of that allegation necessarily involved a question of 
whether a security interest could attach to that mortgage through the PSA. As the trial court 
correctly held, a security interest could only be created through the stipulation of the Plaintiff and 
Mr. McKay or by operation of the law. 
The Plaintiff admitted in her brief that Mr. McKay did not stipulate to granting her a 
security interest in the mortgage. See Appellant ·s Brief; p. 16. As such, the Defendants could 
not have breached their duty in drafting the PSA unless a security interest can be created in the 
mortgage through the operation of law. Below, the Plaintiff argued, had the PSA contained 
certain language, a lien could have been created by vi1tue of either I.C. § 10-1110 and/or LC. § 
32-918. The trial court reviewed those statutes and determined, as a matter of law, that J.C. § 10-
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1110 was inapplicable because a mortgage is not real property for the purposes of that statute and 
J.C. § 32-918 was inapplicable because Mr. McKay did not agree to grant her an interest in the 
mortgage or its proceeds. As is explained in further detail below, the District Court rulings were 
correct, were in compliance with Idaho law, and should be affirmed. 
1. The Trial Court Correctly Ruled that a Mortgage is Not Real Property and, 
therefore, is Personal Property 
A review of Idaho law, as well as the law of other states, establishes that the Court's 
ruling that a mortgage is personal, not real. property was correct. 
Pursuant to I.C. § I 0-1110, any judgment entered in Idaho can be recorded in any county 
where the party against whom the judgment was entered owns real property. ·'[T]he judgment so 
recorded becomes a lien upon all real property of the judgment debtor in the county ... owned by 
him at the time or acquired afterwards at any time prior to the expiration of the lien'' I.C. § l 0-
1110. J.C. § I 0-11 IO does not create a lien on personal property. 
·'Real property" is statutorily defined as "lands, possessory rights to land, ditch and water 
rights, and mining claims, both lode and placer", ·'that which is affixed to land", and ·'that which 
is appurtenant to land." I.C. § 55-101 3. Idaho courts have interpreted the phrase "real property 
of the judgment debtor" to ·'include[] land, possessory rights to land, and that which is 
appurtenant to land. see l.C. § 55-10 I, and is 'coextensive with lands, tenements and 
hereditaments, possessory rights and claims.'" See e.g. Fulton v. Duro, I 07 Idaho 240, 242-43 
3 Appellant asserts that the definition of "real property'' under J.C. § 55-101 has "evolved 
beyond only tangible property". However, Appellant fails to cite any Idaho statute or case law 
supporting her theory. Due to the lack of legal support, the Appellant's assertion should be 
disregarded. 
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(Ct. App. 1984) aff'd, I 08 Idaho 392 (1985) ( citing I.C. § 73-114 ). Pursuant to I.C. § 55-102. 
·'every kind of property that is not real is personal." Below, the District Court properly applied 
the aforementioned established definitions of ·'real property'' and ''personal property'' and 
correctly found that a mortgage is personal property, not real property. Therefore, based upon 
the plain language of I.C. § I 0-1110, a mortgage is not lienable. 
Importantly, the District Court's decision is supported by established Idaho law wherein 
Idaho courts have held that a judgment lien (such as the lien set forth in I.C. § I 0-1110) can only 
be applied to a seller's interest in the proceeds from a real property sale where the seller still 
holds the deed to the real property (and, therefore has an interest in the real property) at the time 
the judgment is entered. In the converse, once a deed is delivered or title is transferred, the seller 
no longer has an interest in the real property and, therefore, his interest in the sale proceeds 
(whether through a mortgage or otherwise) is no longer lienable. Specifically. in First Sec. Bank 
of Idaho, Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657 (1967), the Idaho Supreme Court adopted the 
following majority rule when considering whether a seller's interest in purchase money (i.e. a 
mortgage) was subject to a judgment lien: 
a judgment lien against a vendor after the making of the contract of sale, but prior 
to making and delivery of the deed, extends to all of the vendor's interest 
remaining in the land and binds the land to the extent of the unpaid purchase 
pnce. 
First Sec. Bank of Idaho. Nat. Ass 'n v. Rogers, 91 Idaho 654, 657 (1967) (internal citations 
omitted). Pursuant to that rule, the seller's interest in the sale proceeds is not lienable if the deed 
was delivered or title was transferred before judgment was entered against the vendor. See id.; 
see also Estates o_fSomers v. Clearwater Power Co., 107 Idaho 29 (1984). 
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In Estates of Somers, I 07 Idaho at 30-31, the Idaho Supreme Court applied the 
aforementioned majority rule and held that a seller possessed no interest in real property which 
could be levied under I.C. § 8-539 where the seller did not hold legal title to the property when 
the judgment was entered against it. Instead, the seller, at most, had a vendor's lien (an equitable 
mortgage) which was ·'not a specific and absolute charge on the realty but a mere equitable right 
to resort to it (i.e. the property) on the failure of payment by the vendee." See Estates c~f Somers, 
I 07 Idaho at 30 (internal citations omitted). 
The majority rule set forth in Rogers, 91 Idaho at 657, and the Court's holding in Estates 
of Somers, I 07 Idaho at 30-31, can and has been logically extended in support of the proposition 
that an I.C. § 10-1110 lien cannot be created against a vendor/mortgagee who does not possess 
legal title to the real property at the time judgment is entered. In Fulton, I 07 Idaho at 245, the 
Idaho Court of Appeals cited Estates cf Somers, I 07 Idaho 29, for the proposition that a 
·'purchaser under an executory contract to purchase realty has no interest to which the [LC. § l 0-
111 0] lien of a judgment can attach, where he assigns his interest prior to the rendition of a 
judgment against him." Applying that principle, the Court of Appeals then held that a lien did 
apply to the purchaser's interest therein because the judgment was obtained prior to the 
purchaser's assignment of his interest to a third party (i.e., the assignment of interest did not 
occur until after the judgment was obtained and, therefore, the purchaser still held an interest in 
the real property at the time of the judgment). Fulton, 107 Idaho at 245. 
The District Court's determinations that Mr. McKay's mortgage was personal property 
and not lienable under l.C. § I 0-1110 are also supported by the law in other jurisdictions. For 
instance, the New York Appellate Division held: 
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A lien is nothing more than a right or claim against a property interest (see, 
Black's Law Dictionary 922 [5th ed. 1990]). Entering a money judgment creates a 
lien on any real property of the judgment debtor (CPLR 5203). A real estate 
mortgage is collateral security for the payment of a debt; it is personal property, 
not real property. Mortgages convey no title. They ·'giv[e] rise only to a lien upon 
the land'' (3A Warren's Weed, New York Real Property, Mortgages,§ 1.08 [1987, 
4th ed.] ). For this reason, defendants' lien on Daniel Dattola's mortgage interest 
is simply a lien on a lien and is insufficient to create an interest or estate in the 
mortgaged real property (see, Stickler v. Ryan. 270 A.O. 962, 61 N.Y.S.2d 708, Iv. 
dismissed296 N.Y. 735, 70 N.E.2d 545). 
Johnson v. Augsbury Org., Inc., 167 A.D.2d 783,784,563 N.Y.S.2d 339. 340 (1990). 
2. No Idaho Statute Defines "Mortgage" As Real Property 
Contrary to Plaintiff's representation, there are no Idaho statutes holding that a mortgage 
constitutes real property or even that an interest in a mortgage is an interest in real prope1iy. 
Instead, a mortgage is statutorily defined as "a contract excepting a trust deed or transfer in trust 
by which specific prope1iy is hypothecated for the performance of an act without the necessity of 
a change of possession."4 I.C. § 45-90 l. Nothing in that definition likens a mortgage to real 
property. 
In her brief, the Plaintiff inaccurately represents that I.C. § 8-506A( d) treats "mortgages 
as the equivalent of an interest in real property." Neither "real property" nor ''mortgage·· is 
defined in I.C. § 8-506A(d) or the broader Title 8 Section 5 statutory scheme. Likewise, the 
statutes do not define a mortgage as real property. Contrary to the Plaintiff's proposition, a 
review of the statutory scheme establishes that it differentiates mortgages from real property 
4 The Appellant also incorrectly states that a deed of trust and a mortgage are 
synonymous in Idaho. Such a statement is contrary to the very definition of "mortgage'' as set 
forth in I.C. § 45-90 I which specifically states that a trust deed is not a mortgage. 
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interests. LC. § 8-501 et seq. addresses writs of attachment. J.C. § 8-506 defines the process for 
executing a writ on, inter alia, real property and real prope11y interests. I.C. § 8-506A( d), on the 
other hand, addresses the process for executing a writ on, inter alia, a defendant's interest in a 
mortgage. Notably, if a mortgage was real property, then I.C. § 8-506A(d) would be 
superfluous. "'Statutes and ordinances must be construed so as to give effect to all their 
provisions and not to render any part superfluous or insignificant." See e.g. Evans v. Teton 
Cnty., 139 Idaho 71, 77 (2003). Therefore, LC. § 8-506A(d) cannot stand for the proposition that 
a mortgage is real property or than an interest in a mortgage is an interest in real property. 
Likewise, a plain reading of the remaining statutes cited by the Plaintiff (LC. § 45-902, LC. § 45-
908, LC.§ 55-811, and I.C. § 55-813) establishes that none of them ·'treat a mortgage as a real 
property interest'' as inaccurately alleged by the Plaintiff. 
With that being said, the key issue is not whether a mo11gage is considered an interest in 
real property; rather, the focal issue is whether a mo11gagee · s interest in a mortgage is subject to 
a judgment lien under the laws of the state of Idaho. Even if this Court were to find that a 
mortgage is an interest in real property, Idaho law is still clear that a mortgagee's interest in a 
mortgage is not subject to a lien in Idaho where the title transferred prior to the entry of a 
judgment. See e.g. LC. § I 0-111 0; Rogers, 91 Idaho at 657; Estates of'Somers, I 07 Idaho at 30-
31. 
3. The Defendants Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed to Plaintiff Because Mr. 
McKay's Interests in the Mortgage and Promissory Note were Not Lienable 
Under I.C. § 10-1110 
The Defendants did not breach any duty in their drafting of the PSA because no amount 
of additional language could have created a lienable interest in the Albrethsen Property 
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mortgage. It is undisputed that both Mr. McKay and the Plaintiff assigned their interest in the 
Albrethsen Property before the PSA was negotiated and signed and the Judgment was entered in 
the underlying matter. The PSA negotiations occurred in October and November 2007 with the 
PSA being executed on November 20, 2007. See R 368. The Judgment enforcing the PSA was 
entered on November 29, 2007. See id. Prior to that time and on or about May 5, 2006, Mr. 
McKay and the Plaintiff executed a warranty deed in favor of Status Corporation. See R 763. 
The warranty deed was delivered to Status Corporation on or about November 17, 2006 and was 
recorded on November 30, 2006. See id. The execution and recording of the warranty deed5 
resulted in a complete transfer of any and all interests in the real property to Status Corporation. 
See R 804, fl .6 (Real Estate Purchase and Sale Agreement) (stating that title conveyed by the 
warranty deed ·'shall be marketable and insurable and shall be free and clear of all liens, 
encumbrances, and restrictions, exclusive of' property taxes and liens accepted by Status 
Corporation prior to the November 17, 2006 closing and conveyance of the Albrethsen 
Property). 
Because all interests in the Albrethsen Property were transferred to Status Corporation no 
later than November 30, 2006, Mr. McKay held no interests in the Albrethsen Property which 
could be liened or levied on at the time of the October 20. 2007 mediation, the PSA negotiations 
5 By definition, a warranty deed is a complete transfer of interest in the subject real 
property. See e.g. Idaho Trust Co. v. Eastman, 43 Idaho 142 ( 1926) ("the record of a warranty 
deed, duly executed, acknowledged, and recorded, makes a prima facie case of an absolute 
transfer in this state"); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (9th ed. 2009) (a warranty deed is "A 
deed containing one or more covenants of title; esp., a deed that expressly guarantees the 
grantor's good, clear title ... "). 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF-19 
or when the Judgment was entered. See Estates of Somers, 107 Idaho at 30-31. Thus, at all 
relevant times, there was no legal avenue available to the Defendants whereby security could be 
granted to the Plaintiff in the real property or the mortgage absent an express agreement by Mr. 
McKay. It is undisputed that Mr. McKay would not grant any such security. Accordingly, the 
undisputed facts establish, as a matter of law, that the Defendants did not breach any duty owed 
to the Plaintiff in their drafting of the PSA. 
4. The Defendants Did Not Breach Any Duty Owed to Plaintiff Because The 
Recording Process Set Forth in I.C. § 32-918 Would Not have Provided Any 
Security to the Plaintiff 
The Plaintiff suggests that a lien would have been created in the Albrethsen Property or 
the Albrethsen Property mortgage had the Defendants followed the procedure set fo11h in I.C. § 
32-918 for recording a contract summary. She is incorrect. 
First. J.C. § 32-9 I 8 does not create a security interest or Ii enable right; rather, the statute 
provides an avenue by which a summary of a marriage settlement contract can be recorded in 
lieu of recording the entire contract (which necessarily includes numerous provisions which are 
unrelated to real property). So long as the summary complies with J.C. § 32-918, the recording of 
the summary will have the same force and effect of recording the entire contract under I.C. I 0-
11 IO. See J.C.§ 32-918(3), 32-919. 
Next, the provisions of I.C. § 32-918(2) were not applicable when the PSA was recorded. 
The pertinent text of J.C. §32-918 reads as follows: 
(I) When such contract [ a marriage settlement] is acknowledged or 
proved, it must be recorded in the office of the recorder of every county in which 
any real estate may be situated which is granted or affected by such contract. 
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(2) (a) A summary of the contract may be recorded in lieu of the contract, 
under this chapter or the laws of this state, if the requirements of this section are 
substantially met. 
(b) A summary of the contract shall be signed and acknowledged by all 
parties to the original contract. The summary of the contract shall clearly state: 
(iv) A description of the interest or interests m real property 
created by the contract; and 
(v) The legal description of the property. 
( emphasis added). A plain reading of I.C. § 32-918(2) establishes that it only applies where (I) 
the marriage settlement contract is not recorded; and (2) real property or interests in the real 
property are granted or created by the marriage settlement contract. Here, neither condition is 
met. First, the entire PSA was recorded; therefore, recording a summary was unnecessary. See 
R 52, ,r 20. Next, a plain reading of the PSA establishes that the PSA did not create, grant, or 
affect any legal interest in the A I brethsen prope11y or the mortgage attached thereto. See R 3 71. 
In fact, the very terms of the PSA confirmed that any interest in the mortgage remained the sole 
property of Mr. McKay. See R 376. ,II .9.i. Additionally, the facts establish that the PSA could 
not have granted nor affected any interests in the Albrethsen Property as both the Plaintiff and 
Mr. McKay deeded all of their previously-held interests in the real property to a third party, the 
Status Corporation, one year prior to the marriage settlement and November 20, 2007 execution 
of the PSA. See R 763 (Warranty Deed recorded on November 30, 2006). 
For these reasons, I.C. § 32-918 could not have provided the Plaintiff with a secured 
interest in the Albrethsen property or the Albrethsen property mo1igage under any circumstances. 
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Accordingly, the undisputed facts establish. as a matter of law, that the Defendants did not 
breach any duty when drafting the PSA. 
D. The Trial Court Correctly Held that There Existed a Lack of Proximate Cause 
In her brief, the Plaintiff claims the District Court erred in finding a lack of a genuine 
issue of material fact regarding proximate cause. As explained above, in order for the Plaintiff to 
prevail on her legal malpractice claim, she must prove the Defendants' conduct was the 
proximate cause of her alleged damages. This requires proof that she would have had "'some 
chance of success" in the underlying action but for the Defendants' alleged negligent actions. 
See e.g. Lamb v. Manweiler, 129 Idaho 269,272,923 P.2d 976,979 (1996). Proof of the same 
can only occur through expert testimony. See e.g. Samuel v. Hepworth, Nungester & Lezamiz. 
Inc., 134 Idaho 84, 89 (2000) (holding ''[a] plaintiff must normally produce expert evidence of 
negligence and causation of damages to establish a prima facie case of legal malpractice" as ·'the 
factors involved ordinarily are not within the knowledge or experience of laymen composing the 
jury"). As the Defendants argued below, the Plaintiff cannot establish proximate cause as she 
failed to present expert testimony to support a finding of ''some chance of success ... 
The Plaintiff also cannot establish proximate cause because she cannot prove she would 
have received security in the Albrethsen Property mortgage but for the allegedly insufficient 
PSA drafting by the Defendants. This is because, as was explained above, the mortgage was not 
subject to a judgment lien. 
Before the Trial Court, the Plaintiff claimed proximate cause existed because she would 
not have executed the PSA had she known she was not going to receive a secured interest in the 
Albrcthsen Property mortgage and that she only executed the PSA based upon the October 23, 
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2007 email exchange. That argument failed because, pnor to October 23, 2007 and her 
execution of the PSA, the Plaintiff was already legally obligated, through the October 20, 2007 
handwritten mediation agreement, to a settlement with Mr. McKay wherein she was not going to 
receive any secured interest in property of any type, including the mortgage. See R 269. The 
Handwritten Agreement, which did not provide security or collateral, was legally enforceable 
prior to the execution of the final PSA. See id.,~ 8. Per that agreement, the parties were required 
to enter into a more comprehensive settlement agreement and, if they did not, their only recourse 
was to arbitrate the final settlement terms. See id. (stating "'Parties, through counsel, to 
incorporate these terms into a comprehensive property settlement agreement. Parties agree that 
any dispute over the terms thereof or otherwise over the interpretation of this [handwritten] 
agreement will be submitted to Judge McKee for binding arbitration''). That means, if the 
Plaintiff refused to execute the PSA because she did not receive a secured interest in the 
Albrethsen mortgage, her only recourse was to arbitrate the final settlement terms before the 
mediator. See id. 
In an effort to bypass that undisputed fact, the Plaintiff now argues for the first time on 
appeal that she only entered into the handwritten mediation agreement because, based upon the 
advice of the Defendants, she believed she had security at the time she executed the Handwritten 
Agreement. As this argument was not raised before the District Court, it should be disregarded 
on appeal. Zylstra, 157 Idaho 457. 
This argument also fails as it is not supported by the record. Specifically, the record 
contains no evidence to support a finding that the Defendants made any representations 
regarding security or judgment liens at any time prior to or during the October 20, 2007 
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mediation. In fact, the Plaintiffs citations establish that the only alleged representations 
regarding judgement liens were received on October 23, 2007 and December 12, 2008, which 
were after (not before) the Plaintiff executed the Handwritten Agreement. As the record is void 
of any evidence of any pre-October 20, 2007 representations regarding security or liens, the 
Plaintiff could not have relied on such representations when executing the Handwritten 
Agreement which bound the Plaintiff to a voluntary settlement which lacked any collateral or 
security interests. Likewise, as the District Court noted, the Plaintiff was well aware at the time 
she entered into the Handwritten Agreement and after that the Handwritten Agreement did not 
provide any security. See R 146-47, pp. 116:22-117:4; R 264; R 298. Furthermore, the record 
establishes that the Plaintiff was not aware of the mortgage until November 19, 2007. See R 480. 
p. 2. As such, she could not been advised of a security interest in the mortgage at the time she 
executed the Handwritten Agreement. 
For these reasons, the Plaintiff cannot establish that any representations of the Defendants 
were the proximate cause of her damages. The record does not support a finding that the 
Plaintiff relied on any representations of security at the time she voluntarily entered into the 
Handwritten Agreement. The Plaintiff also cannot establish she would have received a security 
interest in the Albrethsen Property had she arbitrated the settlement terms. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
For the reasons outlined above, the District Court's lvfemorandum Decision and Order 
granting Defendants' Second lvfotionfor Reconsideration and dismissing the case with prejudice 
should be affirmed. 
DATED this 10th day of April, 2015 
By~-..;:,...._ _____ ...__ _____ _ 
Robe1t A. Anderson 
Yvonne A. Dunbar, Of the Firm 
Attorneys for Defendants 
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